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The Impact of Sustainability Reporting on Firm Profitability
Abstract
Using a hand-collected representative sample of 95 publicly traded American firms from various sectors
in 2015-2016, I examine how corporate sustainability reporting affects the financial performance of firms.
I find a positive and significant effect of sustainability reporting on a firm’s return on equity, return on
assets, and profit margin in the subsequent year. However, this relationship is found only for firms with
low institutional ownership. These results suggest that sustainability reporting would be a worthwhile use
of corporate resources for this subset of firms. Further, corporate sustainability reporting is shown to be
an effective substitute for monitoring by institutional investors.
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Introduction
Corporations are becoming increasingly critiqued on the negative impacts of their
business operations on employees, society, and the environment. As the pronounced effects of
corporate mismanagement become highlighted from oils spills, accounting fraud, and employee
mistreatment, companies face tremendous ramifications from their negligence which oftentimes
results in bankruptcy, loss of value, hits to firm reputation, and public distrust. When culprits
like BP1 were placed under scrutiny and examination by investigators after the Deepwater
Horizon disaster in 2010, it was clear to see that the company’s failures were almost entirely
inevitable. Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the University of California-Berkeley,
comments specifically on the fatal flaws of BP’s breach saying, "It's clear that the problem is not
technology, but people” (Hoffman, 2010). This sentiment can be attributed to many other
companies that knowingly cut corners to achieve short-term gains.
As success oftentimes breeds complacency, when a company becomes engulfed in
attaining more and more, it can begin to cause excessive environmental degradation, disregard
corporate regulations, and threaten employee safety – further alarming customers, employees,
suppliers, governments, and investors. These parties are pushing corporate management to
assume responsibility and undertake additional measures towards becoming more socially
responsible.
Known as corporate social responsibility (CSR), this business practice takes into
consideration employee wellbeing, the broader community it serves, and environmental
protection. Despite well-established regulatory measures through agencies like the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that ensure
public company compliance and accountability, malpractice still occurs. Destructive business
decisions result in plummeting stock prices and destroy brand reputation, ultimately affecting not
only markets and shareholders, but also third parties. The obvious and destructive potential of
firms and their management are being noticed. Realizing this, many firms are aware that they
can no longer act as detached entities that disregard society and the environment.
In attempt to mediate concerns, some firms have begun to devote more company
resources toward socially responsible activities, whereas others refuse to participate on belief
that CSR is not aligned with profit maximization. Firms that do invest in reporting on their nonfinancial performance may do so to be transparent to shareholders or believe that it may aid in
profit generation; however, it is unknown if and to what extent sustainability reporting may
affect firm profitability. Acknowledging the fact that there are many other factors that contribute
to firm profitability rather than just CSR, this analysis will specifically focus on whether or not
engaging in sustainability reporting is in the best interest of the firm when it is looking to
enhance value in the short-term. If CSR reporting does enhance firm profitability it would be a
worthwhile investment to firms and not merely a tactic that wastes corporate resources or
something that is just “nice to do.”

1

In 2010, one of BP’s oilrigs exploded, resulting in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Killing 11 workers and
spewing an estimated 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, this event is known to be one of the worst
environmental disasters in American history, as it affected marine and aquatic life and the fishing industry
(Hoffman). These offenses by major companies are clear examples of the irresponsible nature of corporate
management.
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Literature Review
This paper adds to the literature on corporate social responsibility and firm profitability
by examining the relationship between some measure of corporate social responsibility –
sustainability reporting – and profitability. CSR, for the sake of this paper, will be used
interchangeably with sustainability reporting and non-financial reporting. I seek to address how
sustainability reporting influences profitability, depending on the varying amounts of
institutional ownership. In doing so, I see how different levels of institutional ownership impact
a company decision on whether or not to engage in reporting.
Sustainability Reporting
A sustainability report as defined by the Global Reporting Initiative2 (GRI) is, “a report
published by a company or organization about the economic, environmental and social impacts
caused by its everyday activities.” As researchers struggle on adequately measuring corporate
social responsibility, sustainability reporting will act as the proxy for CSR in this econometric
analysis.
These reports further enable companies to provide information regarding the nonfinancial aspects of its operations, ultimately allowing companies to actively engage in a solution
towards improving firm accountability, transparency, and corporate image. As a pioneer in
sustainability reporting, the GRI has transformed sustainability reporting into a practice that is
adopted by organizations all over the world. Whether impacts are positive or negative, a
sustainability report also encompasses the company’s values, governance model, and its
approach towards creating a sustainable global economy. Much like the financial documentation
required for public companies, non-financial reporting can also allow markets to respond to everchanging conditions, keep shareholders informed, and provide an element of transparency into
firm activity. Reporting on other areas such as the economic, social, and environmental profile is
becoming an adopted practice throughout the world, as there is an emerging trend of firms
reporting on non-financial issues (Kolk, 2003; KPMG, 2015). Although compliance and
disclosure of CSR reporting is mandatory in some regions and countries3, it still remains a
voluntary measure in the United States.
Through the creation of the Sustainability Reporting Standards4 the GRI has alleviated
much of the confusion on how to properly report since the strategies used to create reports can
vary widely, as there are no specific accounting principles for social disclosure. The GRI reports
92 percent of the world’s largest 250 corporations report on their sustainability performance, and
74 percent of those companies use GRI Sustainability Standards, demonstrating the wide
2

The GRI operates as an independent international organization that works towards communicating the impact of
business on critical sustainability issues (i.e. climate change, human rights, corruption, etc.).
3
Non-financial reporting has become a mandatory practice instituted by governments throughout Europe but
particularly the EU Commission who has transitioned to requiring large companies to publish regular reports on the
social and environmental impacts of their activities. This is exemplified the transitional phase from the EU Accounts
Modernization Directive (2003) to the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive (2014). The directive applies only to
large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees, which encompasses nearly 6,000 companies
(European Commission, 2014). Since the European Commission promotes the interests of the European Union, the
directive involves the EU’s 28 member countries.
4
The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards include distinctive elements that help indicate the impact of
companies on critical sustainability issues. These elements include: multi-stakeholder input, a record of use and
endorsement, governmental references and activities, independence, and shared development costs. The standards
are a trusted reference for policy makers and regulators worldwide as they encourage and enable credible nonfinancial reporting by the companies under their jurisdictions (Global Reporting Initiative).
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recognition and acceptance of these principles. Kolk (2003), through evaluating trends in
sustainability reporting, found the practice is much more common in industrial sectors and less in
the financial sector, demonstrating that certain sectors that are subject to high risks report more
than others whose day-to-day operations are not creating imminent harm or danger5. This may
be the case for companies that have high-risk operations that could cause large scale
environmental degradation or human rights and employee safety violations; however, it could be
argued that companies in the financial sector are more susceptible to risk and market fluctuations
and can disrupt capital markets – affecting many market segments and the livelihood of
consumers.
In addition, if sustainability reports are not assured by a credible source6, the report may
not accurately reflect the company’s reality in terms of sustainable practices. The GRI’s
“External Assurance of Sustainability Reporting” report seeks to inform reporters and readers as
to why quality assurance is important. Using the national auditing framework, the International
Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 and AA1000AS, assurers seek to increase the
robustness, accuracy and trustworthiness of non-financial and sustainability disclosures.
Assurers are divided into three groups, accountancy, engineering, and sustainability service
firms, each having expertise in different areas to address a company’s needs. This quality
assurance allows reports to be approved by a verifiable, external source and enhance
transparency of firm activity.
Looking back on BP, the company has engaged in assured sustainability reports since
1998, prior to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010. After the incident stock prices
plummeted for the company. Nevertheless, BP has institutional ownership of around 10.5
percent, and if it were part of this study’s sample, it would be considered a firm with low
institutional ownership. Despite their sustainability reports being assured, an important aspect
was overlooked and not included in their reports, something so crucial that ended up being a
major contribution in the Deepwater explosion. In BP’s 2010 sustainability report, its assurer,
Ernst and Young, states a key limitation to their review was that, “Our work did not include
physical inspections of any of BP’s operating assets.” Operating assets are assets acquired for
use in the conduct of the ongoing operations of a business which can include fixed long-term
assets such as a company’s plant and equipment. In BP’s case – its oil rig. This goes to show
that sustainability reports can be crucial in ascertaining areas that companies should and need to
address.
Non-financial Reporting and Profitability
The relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm profitability has
produced inconsistent results, providing no conclusive evidence whether the relationship is
positive, negative, or neutral (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000;
Waddock & Graves, 1997; and Orlitzky, 2001). Despite reporting on social performance being a
voluntary measure, Anderson and Frankle (1980) found that returns to portfolios consisting of
5

Industrial sectors may more involved with reporting due to requirements such like the Conflict Minerals rule
(2012) that was required by the SEC’s 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act, mandating certain publicly-traded
manufacturing companies to review or audit the origin of their minerals (Securities and Exchange Commission).
Because certain materials used in production are oftentimes outsourced from other countries that are subject to civil
conflict and human rights abuses, this rule obligates these manufacturing companies to annually report if what they
produce contains “Conflict Minerals.” These minerals essentially include: tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold
(Reuters).
6
Auditing firms like Ernst & Young.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2017

3

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 14 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4

securities of only firms that disclosed information on their social performance were preferable
compared to non-disclosing firms. Their findings indicate that social disclosure has information
content, and that the market values this disclosure positively. Additionally, examining the
impact of pollution control expenditures disclosures on the stock market, Belkaoui (1976) found
that companies that disclosed their pollution control expenditures showed a temporary, but
substantial, increase in stock market performance after disclosure7. These findings suggest that
managers should allocate a proportion of their resources towards reporting on their attempts to
mitigate the harmful impacts of their business operations – especially those in industries whose
operations could be remarkably destructive.
Corporate Governance and Profitability
Since corporate governance plays an integral part in a firm’s overall wellbeing, how it is
governed should impact its profitability. Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016) found that wellgoverned firms that suffer less from agency problems engage more in CSR. Their results show a
positive relation between CSR and value, suggesting that engaging in CSR can be a means of
generating more returns to investors.
Corporate mismanagement is a strong reason why investors, employees, and society push
for the firm to engage in socially responsible behavior. Even though existing laws and
regulations dictate company actions regarding accounting practices, corporate governance
procedures, and direct environmental impacts8, compliance by firms may still sometimes waver.
Disregard for various laws and safety regulations has resulted in some of the most prominent
environmental disasters and human rights violations caused by corporations. These occasions
don’t just occur by happenstance, but by negligent behavior to amass profusion – while society
bears the cost. As executives attempt to increase company profits over a given time, they may
cut costs in critical areas of operation. Not only does this behavior have tremendous external
consequences, it can also be felt internally through the destruction of firm value, making it
extremely difficult for a firm to recover its reputation. As executives are at the forefront of
making many major decisions involving tradeoffs, the way CEOs are compensated for their job
can contribute to how management decisions are made.
Some question to what extent are these lapses in managerial decision-making influenced
by corporate incentives. Compensation for large public firms is given by some form of equity in
the company – stocks and options – which can be a key driver of many decisions (good or bad)
made within the firm. Minor (2016) explored how executive compensation through highpowered incentives can significantly increase the likelihood of environmental law breaking and
magnitude of environmental harm. The findings suggest that even though incentives are
intended to create positive outcomes, they also have the power to increase misconduct from

7

In this study, prior to disclosure of pollution control expenditures, the disclosing companies performed poorly
compared to the market. The period of four months after disclosure, the stocks of these disclosing companies
performed better than the market, indicating significant reactions to disclosure. The reactions had an immediate but
temporary effect on the market.
8
Reflective of laws including but not limited to: the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Securities Act
(1933), Securities Exchange Act (1934), Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (2010); the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Air Act (CAA) (1970),
Clean Water Act (CWA) (1972), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (1974), Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) (1976), Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (1986), Pollution
Prevention Act (PPA) (1990), and the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) (1976).
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CEOs. Ultimately, CEO responsibility for critical environmental events is crucial due to the
amount of compensation incentives – making insider ownership9 an important control variable.
Corporate Social Responsibility – An Agency Issue?
Concerns over the engagement in corporate social responsibility deal with the question on
where a firm’s responsibility should primarily lie: with shareholders, society – or both?
Corporate finance literature discusses the issue surrounding the agency problem as the existence
of a conflict of interest between a firm’s management and stockholders. If the managerial team
is expected to act in the shareholder’s best interests (i.e. maximize shareholder value), then it
becomes questionable whether or not a firm should act in a socially responsible manner as a
viable reason towards achieving increases in value.
The argument for CSR suggests that socially responsible firms that are more engaged in
addressing not only value maximization, but also environmental protection and social equality,
are better off in the long run. The practice is increasingly adopted by companies and can be seen
in the eye of many firms as a measure to maintain a competitive advantage, attain socially
responsible investors, and use corporate resources effectively towards bettering their corporate
image. By signaling to the world their firm’s “goodness,” through product designations such as
organic, animal-free tested, and made in the USA, companies encourage their customers to feel
that through consumption they are making a difference. Not only do society and consumers value
these tactics, but investors also push for similar strategies like that of non-financial reporting.
Companies are now getting certified as B Corps (B corporations)10, realizing that they are
interdependent and need to redefine what “success” means in business – creating companies that
serve society and shareholders. Additionally, the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, the equivalent to
the Standard and Poor’s 500 index but for socially responsible firms in the U.S., allows investors
to access stocks of companies that have been designated as socially responsible for their positive
environmental, social, and governance characteristics11. Another example, MSCI KLD scores,
help sustainability conscious investors better analyze companies by comparing firms to industry
equivalents on their triple bottom line performance based upon five key environmental, social
and governance (ESG) factors12. These internal and external environments are increasingly
persuading companies to at least consider participating in CSR to appeal to customers and
investors.
Alternatively, the argument against CSR is that it is a waste of corporate resources.
Stubbs, Higgins, & Milne (2013) found that sustainability reporting is considered by some
managers to be unnecessary, time consuming, and expensive, and just a marketing technique –
all of which divert firm management from devoting their energy into other core responsibilities.
Additionally, these non-disclosing firms may not have sufficient discretionary income to
9

Insiders are company directors or senior officers and any person or entity that beneficially owns more than 10% of
a company’s voting shares. However, insider trading encompasses those who trade company shares based on
knowledge that is not available or accessible to the public (i.e. the condition of the company, future plans, etc.)
10
B Corps are for-profit companies certified by the nonprofit B Lab to meet rigorous standards of social and
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency. B Corps consist of more than 2,100 companies from
50 countries and are representative of 130 industries (B Lab).
11
Launched in May 1990 as the Domini 400 Social Index, the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index is one of the first
socially responsible (SRI) indexes. Since May 31, 1994 it has had average annual returns of 9.89%. (MSCI, 2017)
12
The five MSCI KLD key environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors include: environment, community
& society, employees & supply chain, customers, and governance & ethics. Created by KLD Research & Analytics
Inc., these criteria aid in socially responsible investing (SRI).
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contribute to social activities despite interest in doing so. A firm does not undertake
sustainability reporting because there is little pressure to do so by the company, its culture or
business structure, society, or stakeholders. The findings suggest that managers of firms are not
oblivious or ignorant of the social and environmental impacts of their operations. They believe
that there are more direct and effective ways of dealing with firm issues than devoting resources
to produce reports. One suggestion is that the responsibility to encourage more participation in
reporting rests upon stakeholders, whether that is government, industry associations, or
institutional investors.
Institutional Investors
Various financial organizations, funds, or endowments purchase outstanding shares to
obtain an ownership stake in a company in large part to exert influence upon management of that
particular firm. These investors have the ability to enact change within the organization through
threatening to sells their shares, voicing concerns to the board of directors, or remaining passive
or ambivalent in corporate decision making. Due to the fact that executives may have extensive
wealth wrapped up in the organization, as their holdings incentivize them to oversee managerial
decisions, these institutional investors are oftentimes regarded as corporate monitors in firms in
which they invest. Gillan and Starks (2003) found that institutional investors are the primary
actors that prompt change in many corporate governance systems whereby these large
shareholder groups increase the monitoring of the firm’s management. Existing literature
discusses the role of institutional investors as corporate monitors, as they too have considerable
amounts of wealth dependent on the success of the company; therefore, the size of the stake held
by institutional investors influences their power in a firm. Investors with large positions want to
ensure that these investments are handled with care.
Maug (1998) suggested that the amount of influence institutional investors carry is
dependent on the amount they hold in the company. When there are high institutional holdings,
shares are less marketable, leading investors to hold on for longer periods of time. With low
institutional holdings, investors can easily liquidate their shares and have minimal interest and
incentive to adequately act as monitors. This incentivizes these institutional owners to adequately
monitor management to protect their investment. Those with higher holdings typically are more
interested in long-term profitability, so they act as responsible corporate monitors to the firms
they invest in. Their close involvement within these firms can yield tremendous power and
influence upon firm decision-making, especially when investors demand the firm to act in a more
socially responsible manner. The more shares owned by these investors, the greater power and
control they yield within a firm that can lead to significant changes within the firm.
Additionally, Ferreira and Matos (2008) discovered firms with higher ownership by
foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance,
and lower capital expenditures. In terms of the effect of institutional ownership on enhancing
firm performance, Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian (2007) found that there is a
significant relationship between operating cash flow returns and institutional ownership. These
findings stem from a subset of institutional investors, those who are less likely to have business
relationships with the firm. Classified as “pressure insensitive” investors (i.e. investment
companies and independent investment advisors), they may be more likely to impose more
disciplinary action on the firms they invest in. These results suggested that institutional investors
with close business ties to the firm compromise their ability to act as diligent monitors to the
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organization and its management13. Ultimately, the extent of the financial impact of institutional
investor ownership on firm profitability is still unclear.
Institutional investors are increasingly interested in firm management especially if the
company is underperforming. Their initiative in corporate governance can lead to extensive
changes if they sternly demand it, as they have the capability and power to threaten to sell shares
if corporate leadership does not meet their expectations which could lower firm value or signal
the ineffectiveness in corporate leadership. Although many of the prior studies discuss the
impact of institutional investors as being advantageous to the high valuation of firms, there is
still no direct link between whether firms that engage in sustainability reporting yield a higher
financial performance after they engage in reporting.
Data and Methodology
Using cross-sectional data, I examine the impact of sustainability reporting on firm
financial performance with the relative impact of high and low amounts of institutional
ownership. Return on equity, return on assets, and profit margin (dependent variables), were
used as proxies for firm profitability. Corporate sustainability reporting (independent variable)
was measured as a dummy variable. Firms were assigned a value; one if it reported in 2015 and
zero otherwise. Control variables reflecting capital structure (total debt to equity and revenue)
and firm ownership (percent held by insiders and percent held by institutions) were also included
as additional determinants of corporate profitability. The relationship between corporate
sustainability reporting and profitability is estimated in the following regression model:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢
Control Variables
The primary focus is of the impact of sustainability reporting on firm performance.
However, there are other internal corporate and financial mechanisms that serve to influence firm
profitability and are necessary for this analysis. These control variables, which have been
included and examined in prior research, include firm size, ownership, and capital structure. I
discuss these in turn.
I. Firm size. Firm size has been considered as an important determinant of firm
profitability and is included as a performance measure in many alternative studies. Moreover, I
employ the inclusion of firm size as a control variable, as the size of firm does tend to influence
profitability in some, but not necessarily in all industries (Hall & Weiss, 1967; Marcus, 1969;
Abiodum, 2013). Revenue14 will serve as a proxy control variable for firm size and as denoted in
the regression equation; 𝑙𝑟 (log of revenue) will be used to best fit the model.
ii. Capital structure. The capital structure of a firm is the amount of debt and or equity it
uses to finance its operations and growth. Although there is no model for optimal capital
structure, financing can be achieved with various combinations of securities and sources of
funding, depending on firm preferences. The impact of leverage can be a strategy firms use to
finance operations and augment their return on investment (ROI), making it a crucial control
variable in this analysis. The debt-to-equity ratio15 will be used as a proxy to measure this
13

Disclosure: Although this is implied the study does not directly prove this relationship.
Revenue is defined as the amount of money the firm receives over an annual period.
15
Debt/Equity Ratio is a debt ratio is calculated by dividing a company's total liabilities by its stockholders' equity.
A high debt/equity ratio generally means that a company has been aggressive in financing its growth through the
assumption of debt. (Investopedia)
14
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financial leverage. It is indicative of how much debt the company is using to finance its assets
relative to its total shareholder equity, essentially creating a figure that assesses the degree to
which this borrowed money, used to fund projects, increases firm value. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) theorize that the existence of debt and outside equity is the origin of the agency problem,
as corporate leveraging techniques can be a source of conflict between management and
shareholders.
Assuming large amounts of debt to fund projects can be one of those techniques that
promote disagreement between the two parties. Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2011) found that there
is a positive relationship between capital structure and profitability16. Noting that interest
payments on debt are tax deductible, taking on debt in the capital structure aids in the
profitability of the firm – ultimately suggesting that the higher the debt, the higher the
profitability of the firm. Financial leveraging can provide some tax benefits to a firm, since
interest on debt is tax deductible; however, there are increased risks on defaulting on that debt
when there are higher levels of debt.
I used this model for six sub-sample regressions to conduct a comparison of the effects of
whether or not firms were split between high and low institutional ownership.
𝑟𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
𝑟𝑜𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
𝑟𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2 𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5 𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢
Where 𝐵0 is the constant of the regression equation, and 𝐵1 , 𝐵2 , 𝐵3 , 𝐵4 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵5 are the respective
coefficients for csr, lr, inside, institution, and de. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable for
firm profitability ratios in 2016, measured by return on equity, return on assets, and profit
margin, and 𝑢 is the error term (see appendix A for variable descriptions).
All variables are taken from time period 𝑡 = 2016 except the dependent variable 𝑐𝑠𝑟,
which is taken from time period 𝑡 − 1 = 2015. A lag is placed on the 𝑐𝑠𝑟 variable (𝑡 − 1)
while the other variables in the regression are kept contemporaneous (𝑡) to mitigate the issue of
reverse causality17. This means that using 𝑐𝑠𝑟 (𝑋) from the year prior than the profitability
measures rules out profitability (𝑌) as being the reason that firms engage in sustainability
reporting. If sustainability reporting does affect firm profitability, it presumably would do so
prior to the year of better or worse performance. I hypothesize that firms that engage in
sustainability reporting will demonstrate better financial performance. That is, a positive
relationship will exist such that companies decide to report in the prior year, their return on
equity, return on assets, and profit margin will increase in the following year.
Information on company’s sustainability reporting tendencies was retrieved from the
Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Disclosure Database from the year 2015. The
16

Using data from 272 publicly listed American firms in the service and manufacturing industries over a period of
three years (2005-2007), Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2011) assess short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total
assets, and total debt to total assets on profitability (return on equity) – while using sales growth and firm size as
controls.
17
Reverse causality means that X and Y are associated, but not in the way you would expect. Instead of X causing a
change in Y, it is really the other way around: Y is causing changes in X.
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complete version of data had to be requested from the organization through submission of the
“GRI Reports List Request Form.” This detailed database provides an aggregate overview of all
reports published from 1999 till present. As an undergraduate student, the complete version of
the GRI Reports List was free of charge with proof of enrollment at a college institution. With
permission to use the GRI’s complete compilation of data, I agreed to not share any raw data
from the list with third parties. This list provides access to all types of sustainability reports,
whether GRI-based or otherwise, and other information relevant to the companies that report.
A data set was constructed from the GRI’s selection of companies to include 95 publicly
traded American companies from various industries that either reported or did not report in the
year 2015. I used a stratified random sampling method18 to get a balance of companies from a
wide variety of sectors that reported and did not report in 2015. For each company, data were
collected on each firm’s profit margin, return on assets, return on equity, revenue, percentage
held by insiders, and percentage held by institution. All financial data were gathered using
Yahoo Finance for the year 2016. Financial data from the subsequent year, from when a firm
reported or did not report, were used to predict current values of the dependent variable, thus
avoiding reverse causality. I consider the sample to be a representative sample of American
firms across a variety of sectors that did or did not choose to report.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. All variables were calculated using
the data analysis and statistical program Stata. Total observations fluctuated for each variable
due to some missing data or data that were not applicable to that firm. In the non-reporters
category, total observations came to 41 firms. The average profitability indicators for this group
are as follows: return on equity at 16.81percent, return on assets at 5.73 percent, and profit
margin at 8.75 percent. Other mean values for explanatory variables include revenue at $28.19
billion, insider ownership at 8.96 percent and institutional ownership at 83.53 percent, and total
debt to equity ratio at 103.62.
For the reporting group, total observations came to 54 firms. The average profitability
indicators are as follows: return on equity at 26.43 percent, return on assets at 5.99 percent, and
profit margin at 13.12 percent. The mean values for the explanatory variables include revenue at
$41.63 billion, insider ownership is 7.24 percent and institutional ownership is 76.67 percent,
and a total debt to equity ratio of 204.6. The median value for reporters in terms of return on
equity, return on assets, and profit margin is greater than those of non-reporters; however, when
compared with the mean values, the difference is not as noteworthy. But it is important to
examine as the median value is not as influenced by outliers, which indicate that the sample
means may be more affected by outlying values.

18

Stratified random sampling is a method of sampling that involves the division of a population into smaller groups
known as strata. In this method, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics then
pooled to form a random sample.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics of Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables
csr

variable

mean

sd

p25

p50

p75

N

0

roe
roa
ros
revenuebil~s
inside
de
institution

16.808
5.73
8.746341
28.18613
6.32825
103.6185
84.0775

20.67888
4.519958
7.955445
71.24655
9.356071
80.13585
17.88451

8.645
3.01
2.81
3.61
.295
42.73
71.15

13.58
4.58
7.99
7.34
1.49
81.21
86.95

20.695
7.47
13.66
15.81
9.875
123.61
96.85

40
41
41
41
40
39
40

1

roe
roa
ros
revenuebil~s
inside
de
institution

26.42796
5.992407
13.10741
41.62667
7.240204
204.597
76.66531

45.32911
5.084704
21.5236
52.68763
17.35921
526.9617
18.16866

6.17
2.13
3.06
7.44
.12
43.43
68.7

13.725
5.665
7.615
19.885
.38
101.53
78.4

27.79
8.78
16.29
55.23
6.42
149.29
89.2

54
54
54
54
49
53
49

Total

roe
roa
ros
revenuebil~s
inside
de
institution

22.33436
5.879158
11.22526
35.82601
6.830337
161.7909
79.99663

37.05622
4.825772
17.11285
61.40034
14.26082
404.8189
18.31824

7.48
2.71
2.9
5.46
.2
43.215
70.7

13.58
5.07
7.89
12.5
1
92.455
83

22.08
8.19
14.17
39.3
7.31
138.06
92

94
95
95
95
89
92
89

Table 2 shows sector diversity of the firms within the sample. In order to assess the
impact of reporting on an entire economy, a representative sample of firms was chosen, not just
those centered in certain industries. Firms within the retailers sector constitute the largest group
included in the study.
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Table 2 - Distribution of Firms by Sector
Sector

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Agriculture
Automotive
Aviation
Chemicals
Commercial Services
Computers
Conglomerates
Construction Materials
Consumer Durables
Energy
Energy Utilities
Equipment
Financial Services
Food and Beverage Products
Healthcare Products
Healthcare Services
Household and Personal Products
Logistics
Media
Metals Products
Other
Railroad
Real Estate
Retailers
Technology Hardware
Telecommunications
Textiles and Apparel
Tobacco
Tourism/Leisure
Toys
Waste Management
Water Utilities

3
3
3
2
2
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4
2
4
3
3
4
3
2
3
1
3
6
3
3
4
2
1
1
3
3

3.16
3.16
3.16
2.11
2.11
4.21
4.21
3.16
3.16
3.16
3.16
4.21
4.21
2.11
4.21
3.16
3.16
4.21
3.16
2.11
3.16
1.05
3.16
6.32
3.16
3.16
4.21
2.11
1.05
1.05
3.16
3.16

3.16
6.32
9.47
11.58
13.68
17.89
22.11
25.26
28.42
31.58
34.74
38.95
43.16
45.26
49.47
52.63
55.79
60.00
63.16
65.26
68.42
69.47
72.63
78.95
82.11
85.26
89.47
91.58
92.63
93.68
96.84
100.00

Total

95

100.00
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Table 3 provides additional descriptive statistics showing the levels of institutional
ownership of the firms in the sample. I used the median value of the sample levels of
institutional ownership to categorize them as being either high or low in terms of institutional
ownership in the regression. Firms above 82.95 percent are considered firms with “high”
institutional ownership, and firms that fall below that threshold are considered firms with “low”
institutional ownership. As a few firms do not have any institutional ownership, the number of
observations for the regressions decreases. Therefore, these observations are not included in the
regression. When examining the table, institutional ownership exceeds 100 percent, which is
possible. If an organization holds a certain number of shares, and an institution owns all of those
shares, of which some are borrowed by a second firm, then in the process of shorting those
shares to a third institution, the second institution sells a stock that they do not own. In this
instance, multiple parties own the share of a stock, thus, institutional ownership exceeds 100
percent (Asquith, Pathak, & Ritter, 2005).
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics - Amount of Institutional Ownership of Firms –
Percentage Breakdown

%Held By Institutions

1%
5%
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
95%
99%

Percentiles
14.6
46.7
60.6
70.7

Smallest
14.6
18.1
34.2
40.8

83
92
99.4
101.8
120.6

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol14/iss1/4

Largest
104.7
105.5
119.1
120.6

Obs
Sum of Wgt.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

89
89
79.99663
18.31824
335.5581
-1.010017
5.201684
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Results
Table 4 Lagged Regression of Profitability - Results Breakdown by “Low” and “High”
Levels of Institutional Ownership

Regression
Ownership
Dependent
csr

1
2
3
4
5
6
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
roe
roe
roa
roa
ros
ros
22.041*
-10.809
3.324**
-1.634
10.719*
0.552
[0.077]
[0.113]
[0.034]
[0.330]
[0.078]
[0.925]
ln(revenue) -3.634
4.415
-0.521
1.416*
-3.276*
0.466
[0.333]
[0.157]
[0.267]
[0.072]
[0.078]
[0.864]
Inside
-0.329
-0.105
-0.021
-0.082
-0.001
-0.663
[0.402]
[0.872]
[0.674]
[0.611]
[0.995]
[0.248]
Institution
0.135
-0.619
0.055
-0.062
0.034
-0.371
[0.779]
[0.178]
[0.362]
[0.578]
[0.886]
[0.349]
Debt/Equity 0.056***
0.04
0
-0.002
-0.004
0.014
[0.000]
[0.315]
[0.921]
[0.851]
[0.378]
[0.692]
Intercept
8.206
67.903
1.981
10.406
15.778
44.332
[0.822]
[0.154]
[0.663]
[0.374]
[0.377]
[0.285]
N
43
42
43
43
43
43
R-sq
0.549
0.219
0.154
0.169
0.132
0.1
p-values in brackets
="* p<0.1
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01"
A positive relationship was found between CSR reporting and all measures of
profitability for firms with low institutional ownership. Table 4 provides all six regressions and
associated significance levels. Regression (1) indicates that sustainability reporting and capital
structure all have a positive and significant impact on firm return on equity. The coefficient on
𝑐𝑠𝑟 is positive (22.041) and significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.077). Moreover, the
economic impact of sustainability reporting on roe is relatively important. Holding all other
variables constant, the model predicts that when a firm decides to switch to reporting, return on
equity would increase return on equity by 22 percent. Note that 54.9 percent (𝑅 2 = 0.549) of
the variance of the degree of profitability can be explained by the degree of 𝑐𝑠𝑟,
𝑙𝑟, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and 𝑑𝑒. Regression (3) indicates that sustainability reporting has a
positive and significant impact on a firm’s return on assets. The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 is positive
(3.324) and significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.034). The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 suggests
that a firm would experience a 3.324 percent increase in return on assets by engaging in
sustainability reporting. Regression (5) demonstrates that 𝑐𝑠𝑟 reporting has a positive and
significant impact on a firm’s profit margin. The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 (10.719) is positive and
significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.078). This result implies that sustainability
reporting enhances a firm’s profit margin by 10.719 percent.
The robust results are statistically significant in that sustainability reporting has a positive
impact on profitability regarding firms with low amounts of institutional ownership. Firms with
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high amounts of institutional ownership do not see the same relationship, and in fact have
negative relationships between return on equity and 𝑐𝑠𝑟 as well as return on assets and 𝑐𝑠𝑟
reporting. The results suggest that firms that decide to report and have low institutional
ownership could potentially see large increases in return on equity, return on assets, and profit
margin in the short term. Sustainability reporting for firms with low institutional ownership
could act as a substitute for other means in enhancing profitability and monitoring mechanism to
make them more competitive with other firms.
Conclusion
I have explored how sustainability reporting impacts the profitability between firms with
high and low institutional ownership. It can be extremely beneficial as a substitute in enhancing
firm profitability where there is an absence, or lack of, significant institutional ownership. At
least in this sample, sustainability reporting has significant impact on a firm’s profitability in the
short-term; however, one size does not fit all. This study provides an important guide to
managers by demonstrating not all companies should engage in CSR reporting – only companies
with low institutional ownership. These findings suggest that by engaging in sustainability
reporting, firms with lower institutional ownership show significant improvements in financial
performance in the subsequent year after reporting. For companies that lack a large amount of
institutional ownership and are not necessarily interested or motivated to pursue an active role in
the corporation, it would be expected that they do not exert much influence over corporate
governance. Engaging in sustainability reporting for these firms would prove to be quite
beneficial in realizing increases in profitability, allowing them an alternate measure or strategy to
potentially reap huge gains to increase shareholder value when there is an absence or lack of
institutional ownership. The key here is that institutional investors have tremendous influence
because they have the financial firepower to yield significant change in corporate management,
and if there is a lack of institutional ownership, sustainability reporting could fulfil a piece of that
monitoring role.
One key limitation to the study was omitting a key variable that has been shown to be an
important determinant of profitability – R&D investment. McWilliams and Siegel (2000)
suggested that these inconsistencies between CSR and profitability are due to misspecifications
in the model by omitting R&D investment. R&D investment is linked to improvements in longrun economic performance (Griliches, 1979); (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991); (Hall 1999). If
R&D is found to have a positive impact on firm performance, then it would make sense to
include the variable within the regression to avoid overestimation in others that are closely
related to R&D investments. Unlike findings from McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988)
that indicate prior performance being more closely related to CSR, this study finds that
subsequent performance is linked to engagement in CSR.
For future research, adjustments could be made for differences in industry profitability.
Taking the difference between the individual firm’s profitability and its industry median should
be accounted for, as it is less affected by the influence of outliers. By comparing a company’s
performance to industry peers (benchmarking), we could get insight in a firm’s performance
relative to firms within its own industry. As some industries have higher profitability than
others, seeing how the profitability and CSR relationship will vary by industry could prove
insightful. Another suggestion to guide future research would be to include another dummy
regressor indicating whether or not reports were assured or not. Including this assurance variable
could help show if assuring reports is another viable means towards generating returns, as the
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credibility of reports is enhanced by an auditor.
One last suggestion would be to obtain data across multiple years to assess the long-term
impact of sustainability reporting on firm profitability. Using long-term financial data could
indicate whether sustainability reporting is a worthwhile investment for the long term and not
just a short-term remedy for firms to enhance profitability. This would show over time whether
or not CSR enhances profitability, diminishes it over time, has a neutral impact, or even taking
an inverse exponential growth trajectory, increasing sharply in the rewards to firms in the shortterm, but ultimately plateauing in the long run as it may become a routine procedure for all
corporations. All further extensions of this research could prove promising.
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Appendix A: Variable Description
Measure
Variable

Symbol

Source

Description

Year

Corporate Social
Responsibility
(Independent)

Sustainability
Reporting (Dummy)

csr

Global Reporting
Initiative's
Sustainability
Disclosure Database

Don't Report = 0 & Report = 1

2015

Ownership (Control)

% Held By Insiders

inside

Yahoo Finance

Total number of shares owned
by insiders divided by the total
shares outstanding

2016

% Held By
Institutions

institution

Yahoo Finance

2016

Profit Margin (%)

ros

Yahoo Finance

Ownership stake in a company
that is held by large financial
organizations.
Net Income/Revenue

Return on Assets (%)

roa

Yahoo Finance

Net Income/Total Assets

2016

Return on Equity (%) roe

Yahoo Finance

Net Income/Shareholder Equity

2016

Revenue (in billions)

Yahoo Finance

Income received during a specific
period
log(revenue)

2016

Total Liabilities/Shareholder
Equity

2016

Profitability
(Dependent)

Size (Control)

revenuebil~s
lr

Capital Structure
(Control)

Total Debt/Equity
(Ratio)
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de

Yahoo Finance

2016

2016
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